Advertisement






AudioCodes VoIP Phones Insufficient Firmware Validation

CVE Category Price Severity
CVE-2023-22955 CWE-1326 $10,000 High
Author Risk Exploitation Type Date
Anonymous High Remote 2023-08-17
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS vector description

Our sensors found this exploit at: https://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2023080072

Below is a copy:

AudioCodes VoIP Phones Insufficient Firmware Validation
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Advisory ID:               SYSS-2022-055
Product:                   AudioCodes VoIP Phones
Manufacturer:              AudioCodes Ltd.
Affected Version(s):       Firmware Versions >= 3.4.4.1000
Tested Version(s):         Firmware Version 3.4.4.1000
Vulnerability Type:        Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware (CWE-1326)
Risk Level:                Medium
Solution Status:           Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-11-14
Solution Date:             N.A.
Public Disclosure:         2023-08-10
CVE Reference:             CVE-2023-22955
Authors of Advisory:       Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH
                            Moritz Abrell, SySS GmbH

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

AudioCodes VoIP phones are modern desk phones which are used for the
operation in enterprise environments.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"The AudioCodes 400HD series of IP phones is a range of easy-to-use,
feature-rich desktop devices for the service provider hosted services,
enterprise IP telephony and contact center markets. Based on the same
advanced, field-proven underlying technology as our other VoIP products,
AudioCodes high quality IP phones enable systems integrators and end
customers to build end-to-end VoIP solutions."

Due to insufficient firmware validation, an attacker can store
malicious firmware on AudioCodes IP phones.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

By analyzing the firmware image and update mechanism of AudioCodes IP
phones, it was identified that parsing and verification of the firmware
image is done by the ELF executable "flasher" which is executed from
the script "run_ramfs_for_upgrade.sh" located at the path
"/home/ipphone/scripts/".

When analyzing the software tool "flasher", SySS found out that the
validation of firmware images only consists of simple checksum checks for
different firmware components.

Thus, by knowing how to calculate and where to store the required checksums
for the "flasher" tool, an attacker is able to store malicious firmware on
AudioCodes IP phones.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

An AudioCodes IP phone's firmware image file contains an image header
followed by different sections, e.g.:

     1. Firmware image header
     2. bootloader.img
     3. rootfs.ext4
     4. phone.img
     5. section.map
     6. flasher
     7. release
     8. end.section

Each section starts with the 4 magic bytes "0xBB 0xBB 0xBB 0xBB"
followed by a 4-byte section header size field ("0x60 0x00 0x00 x00")
and other metadata like length fields and a checksum at the offset
0x50. This checksum is calculated by adding up all bytes of the section
data starting at the section offset 0x60.

As a proof of concept, a manipulated firmware image file was created in
which an additional user with root privileges was added in the
"rootfs.ext4" section. After recalculating the checksum and updating
the section header with its checksum, the manipulated firmware image
could be successfully uploaded and installed on an AudioCodes IP phone.

To automate this task, a simple Python script has been developed to
deal with AudioCodes IP phone firmware images.

The following output exemplarily shows how a modified firmware image
for the AudioCodes IP phone C450HD was updated with correct checksums:

#> python3 audiocodes-firmware-tool.py -i AudioCodes_UCC450HD_3.4.6.604.1.img -u

AudioCodes Firmware Tool v0.3 by Matthias Deeg - SySS GmbH (c) 2022
- ---
Image infos
===========
Hardware:                   C450HD
Software:                   UC_3.4.6.604.1
Version:                    25 (0x19)
Number of sections:         4
Header length:              112 (0x70)
Checksum:                   0x00000877
Calculated checksum:        0x00000877
Attribute:                  7 (0x00000007)
Date:                       2021-12-13_09:07:38
CE5:                        0
- ---
Section name:               bootloader.img
Section checksum:           0x0247D1A3
Calculated checksum:        0x0247D1A3
Data size (8-byte aligned): 423992 (0x67838)
Data size                 : 423992 (0x67838)
- ---
Section name:               rootfs.ext4
Section checksum:           0x78EF3E3D
Calculated checksum:        0x78EF3E6D
Data size (8-byte aligned): 134238208 (0x8005000)
Data size                 : 134238208 (0x8005000)
- ---
[...]

[*] Saved updated firmware image to AudioCodes_UCC450HD_3.4.6.604.1.img.new

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

Not yet fixed.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2022-11-10: Vulnerability discovered
2022-11-14: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2022-12-12: Vulnerability confirmed by AudioCodes Ltd.
2023-01-19: AudioCodes Ltd. informs that a solution is planned in 2023
2023-07-13: AudioCodes Ltd. sets solution date to the end of 2023
2023-08-10: Public disclosure at BlackHat USA[4]
2023-08-11: Public disclosure athttps://blog.syss.com[5]

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] AudioCodes IP Phones Product Website
     https://www.audiocodes.com/solutions-products/products/ip-phones
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-055
     https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-055.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
     https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] BlackHat USA Briefings Session
     https://www.blackhat.com/us-23/briefings/schedule/#zero-touch-pwn-abusing-zooms-zero-touch-provisioning-for-remote-attacks-on-desk-phones-31341
[5] Detailed Blog Post
     https://blog.syss.com/posts/zero-touch-pwn/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg and Moritz Abrell
of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail:[email protected]
Public Key:https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key Fingerprint: D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

E-Mail:[email protected]
Public Key:https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Abrell.asc
Key Fingerprint: 2927 7EB6 1A20 0679 79E9  87E6 AE0C 9BF8 F134 8B53

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=wsHl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Copyright ©2024 Exploitalert.

All trademarks used are properties of their respective owners. By visiting this website you agree to Terms of Use.